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1.  Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
  As the new millennium dawned, the European Union (EU) began negotiating the first of 
several important pieces of EU legislation on immigration, which had been possible ever since 
Brussels gained limited powers in this area under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Hix and Niessen 
1996, Geddes 2000).  This was a startling development, considering the fact that border control 
is an area of “high politics” and a core feature of the Westphalian state; and especially 
considering the politically charged and controversial debates swirling around immigration in 
Europe.  If governments were often accused of “losing control” over immigration, one wonders 
why some would be willing to turn immigration policy over to Brussels (and why others were 
opposed).  This raises a puzzling question, to be answered in the pages that follow: which 
European governments supported an EU immigration policy, and why? 
Perhaps the most high-profile EU immigration law was the directive
1 on the status and 
rights of so-called “Long-Term Residents” (European Council, various years).  This directive 
sought to standardize the treatment of these immigrants across countries, and in its initial form 
(as proposed by the European Commission in 2001) was fairly generous towards immigrants, 
and would hold member states to rigorously binding standards in terms of how they could treat 
and process these immigrants (conditions for gaining and renewing their status, etc.).  Around 
the same time, the governments of Western Europe were under tremendous pressure on the issue 
of immigration.  In some countries, voracious tabloid media, hostile public opinion and high-
                                                 
1 A “directive” is a type of EU law that mandates member state action without specifying implementation 
mechanisms. 
  1profile political voices on the far Right were shaping the debate, and pushing governments 
towards a crackdown on immigrant rights. 
  Thus, one immediately wonders about governmental preferences and whether EU 
bargaining met these preferences.  How did the Long-Term Residents Directive compare with 
domestic legislation in these three countries in terms of its generosity?  While the original 2001 
Commission proposal was as generous (and even more generous in some areas) as domestic law 
in many states, the Directive was whittled down during three years of negotiations, in terms of its 
generosity towards immigrants (European Council, various years).  By the time of the law’s 
adoption in 2003, it was less generous towards immigrants than Belgian or French law, for 
example.  As we will see in the pages below, this allowed the Belgian and French governments, 
who had been relatively unsuccessful in autonomously restricting immigrant rights at the 
national level (especially in Belgium) to adopt a Directive that would allow them to use the 
supremacy of EU law over national law to force down the standard of immigrant rights 
protection in their respective countries. 
But what about Britain, who ultimately “opted out” of the directive?  In fact, unlike in 
Belgium or France, this article will show that the British government was fully able to crack 
down on immigrant rights at the national level, between 2000 and 2004, and thus had no need 
for the European Union.  I interviewed a British negotiator in the European Council in 2003, and 
she expressed favorable sentiments about the “toughness” of the Directive, speculating that 
Britain might eventually opt in.
2  However, one year later I interviewed her replacement, who 
denied that Britain had, or would ever have, any need or desire to opt into this directive.
3  Why 
                                                 
2 Author Interview #11, British Representative (anonymous by request of subject), Brussels, Belgium, 29 July 2003.  
All data, including interview transcripts, available from author upon request. 
3 Author Interview #29, British Representative (anonymous by request of subject), Brussels, Belgium, 25 November 
2004. 
  2not?  As we will see in the pages below, by 2004 Prime Minister Blair was able to dramatically 
lower the UK’s standards of protection without adopting the Long Term Residents Directive or 
any other EU directive.
4  Therefore, the British government was able to maximize domestic 
sovereignty, looking tough on immigration while also appearing to keep the control of national 
borders out of the hands of unelected Eurocrats in Brussels. 
  Why was Britain different, and why was the Belgian government particularly 
unsuccessful in restricting immigrant rights at national level?  This article will explain the 
differences between these three countries, using data from public opinion sources and my own 
participant interviews with political actors.  Specifically, I aim to test the hypothesis that 
governments’ varying support for supranational immigration policy control can be explained by 
the combination of the political salience of immigration in their country, and the degree to which 
their country’s national institutions protect immigrant rights from governmental interference 
(Guiraudon 1997, 1998, 2002).  I expect to find that in countries where political salience is high, 
but national-institutional rights protection is strong, governments will be supportive of EU 
control over immigration policy.  However, in countries where national-institutional rights 
protection is weak, governments will prefer to keep immigration control a national issue, since 
high salience on its own tends to push against supporting EU control (governments accused of 
losing control over immigration).  This argument draws on three strains of theoretical literature: 
1) the intergovernmentalist argument that supranational institutions facilitate executive 
preferences that cannot be met domestically (Moravcsik 1998); 2) work on federalism and 
American politics showing how political actors “venue shop” across fora for the most favorable 
institutional climate (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Guiraudon 2000); and work on “2-level 
games”, showing how governments strategically use international bargaining for the purposes of 
                                                 
4 With the exception of Directives on political asylum, which is explained at the end of Section Four. 
  3blame avoidance (Vink 2001, Rotte 1998, Vaubel 1994, Putnam 1988).  In order to broaden the 
analysis and test for alternative explanations, I will also include the hypothesis that political 
partisanship is not a variable that explains variance in governmental support for EU control over 
immigration policy, except in one particular policy area; namely, in policies to integrate already-
resident, legal immigrants into society (Money 1999). 
  Given that detailed examination of all 15 “old” EU member states is beyond the scope of 
this article, I have selected three countries (Belgium, France and the UK) according to Mill’s 
method of difference.
5  Essentially, these three countries were chosen because they offer the 
strongest variation possible on the dependent variable, governmental support for harmonization 
of immigration policy.  The Belgian government has been the strongest supporter of EU control 
over immigration policy, while the British government has been the strongest opponent.  France, 
on the other hand, has been a relatively neutral, moderate country on this topic, despite having 
arguably the most political influence of any country in Brussels (Hix and Niessen 1996, Givens 
and Luedtke 2004).  I seek to explain why we see such wide variation among these three 
countries, and the data that follow assess the relationship between this variation, and the degree 
of political salience, national-institutional rights protection, and political partisanship (Left 
power) in each country. 
 
2.  Belgium 
  The case of Belgium presents a fascinating puzzle for scholars of immigration policy.  
Despite having Europe’s strongest Radical Right party in terms of electoral support (with 18 
percent of the vote share, the Radical Right Vlaams Belang is now the most popular single party 
                                                 
5 The countries were also selected due to language reasons (I speak French, and therefore could interview political 
actors in France and Belgium). 
  4in Belgium), Belgium consistently and stridently supports turning over immigration policy to the 
European Union.  This is a puzzle because previous scholarship has shown that Radical Right 
parties gain most of their political leverage by accusing national governments of losing control 
over immigration (Givens 2002, 2005).  And given that the European Union’s central 
organizations (the Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice) have shown preferences for 
liberal immigration policy (Luedtke 2005), it is quite surprising to find that in a country where 
the national government is “under siege” to the degree that Belgium’s government is, this 
government can strongly support giving up national control over immigration. 
  This section will show how my hypothesis of an interaction effect between political 
salience and national rights protection can explain the paradox of Belgium.  Specifically, I will 
demonstrate how in the last decade, the combination of high political salience, along with strong 
institutional protection for immigrant rights at national level, have combined to push Belgium’s 
governments towards supporting EU control over immigration policy.  Seeing the Vlaams 
Belang gain in vote strength from 10 percent in 1991, to 12 percent in 1995, to 15 percent in 
1999, to 18 percent in 2003, successive Belgian governments were desperate to crack down on 
immigration.  And yet I will demonstrate below how Belgium’s uncommonly strong institutional 
rights protection for immigrants prevented the government from doing this at the national level.  
Thus, successive Belgian governments turned to the EU, knowing that the immigration policies 
coming out of Brussels were highly restrictive in comparison with Belgium’s own legislation, 
and would thus allow Belgium to dodge domestic institutional constraints in lowering its 
standards of immigrant rights protection, thus stemming the tide of far-Right voting.
6
                                                 
6 Though the EU laws, as proposed by the Commission, were initially quite generous towards immigrant rights, after 
being negotiated in the European Council, the final versions of the directives (on topics such as family reunification 
and long-term residents) were much less generous than Belgian law. 
  5  With 12 percent of the vote in 1995, the Vlaams Belang (at that time called the Vlaams 
Blok) were already a force to be reckoned with in the mid-1990s.  Rising to 15 percent of the 
vote in the 1999 federal elections, the party derived its support from the growing political 
salience of immigration in Belgium (Erk 2004).  During the 1990s, a relatively liberal 
immigration policy at national level resulted in an increasing population of immigrants.  Between 
1991 and 1999, the number of foreign workers legally entering Belgium rose from five thousand 
per year to nine thousand per year, the number of foreigners acquiring Belgian nationality rose 
from eight thousand per year to 24 thousand per year, and the number of political asylum-seekers 
entering Belgium rose from 15 thousand per year to 36 thousand per year (SOPEMI 2005).   
Throughout the 1990s, the political salience of immigration as an issue rose in tandem 
with these numbers.  In 1993, the EU’s Eurobarometer poll asked citizens of all 12 member 
states whether they agreed with the statements that “we should not accept immigrants” from the 
“South Mediterranean” and “Eastern Europe”.  Belgium’s scores were second and third-highest 
in the EU-12 on these two questions, respectively, with 32 percent of Belgians against admitting 
immigrants from the “South Mediterranean”, and 28 percent of Belgians against admitting 
Eastern Europeans.  The 1993 Eurobarometer also asked whether immigrants are “a big 
problem”, and Belgium scored third-highest in the EU-12 on this question, with 70 percent of 
Belgians agreeing that immigrants are a big problem!  In 1994, this same question was asked, 
and the percentage increased to 72 percent, making Belgium tied for second place (with Italy) in 
terms of hostile public opinion (Eurobarometer, various years). 
In 1996, the Eurobarometer asked a very revealing question for the purposes of my 
research; namely, whether respondents were afraid that European integration would lead to more 
immigration.  A majority of Belgians answered this question in the affirmative (Eurobarometer 
  61996).  Not only does this confirm the high political salience of immigration in Belgium, but it 
also rules out a potential alternative explanation to my hypothesis: namely that governmental 
support for EU control over immigration, and public support for the EU in general, are causally 
related.  Indeed, Belgians always tend to be among the leading EU publics in terms of general 
support for the EU, and yet the poll numbers detailed here show Belgians to be quite hostile to 
immigration (Eurobarometer, various years).  Thus, if Belgians are hostile to immigration, but a 
majority of them think that the EU will lead to more immigration, then we wouldn’t expect to see 
the strong Belgian support for European integration that we do see.  In other words, the Belgian 
government’s unwavering support for EU control over immigration policy seems to have little to 
do with the fact that the Belgian public is strongly pro-EU. 
As the new millennium approached, the Belgian public grew even more hostile to foreign 
faces on their streets.  In 1997, the Eurobarometer asked two questions about “minorities”; 
specifically, whether they “cause insecurity”, and whether there are “too many” in our country.  
Out of the (at that time) 15 countries in the EU, Belgians ranked third in feeling that minorities 
cause insecurity.  More strikingly, Belgians ranked first in responding that their country had “too 
many minorities”, with 51 percent agreeing.  In fact, Belgium was the only EU-15 country where 
a majority of its citizens agreed with this statement!  Additionally, the 1997 Eurobarometer 
asked whether the country “has reached its limit” in terms of immigrants, and Belgium ranked 
second in the EU-15 (only behind Greece), with 70 percent agreeing with this statement. 
Consistent with my emphasis on political salience and the role of the media in pressuring 
politicians, the Belgian media helped boost the political salience of immigration by keeping the 
issue in the public eye (usually in a negative sense), and putting pressure on the national 
government to crack down.  Patrick Ireland (2004, 222) finds that “the print and broadcast media 
  7helped set the tone for policy deliberations . . . at the national level they habitually equated 
immigrant-origin populations with crime and insecurity and perpetuated notions that they posted 
a problem for the host society and a threat to social order and cohesion.” 
With such stridently anti-immigrant public opinion, in tandem with growing support for 
the Vlaams Belang, one might expect Belgian authorities to respond to this salience by cracking 
down on immigration and tightening the laws governing immigrants’ rights and freedoms.  In 
fact, no such thing happened – if anything, Belgian immigration policy grew more liberal!  In 
1999, the government carried out a large regularization of illegal immigrants, and in 2000 a 
detailed legal study by Groenendijk, Guild and Barzilay (2000, 98-101) found that among the 15 
EU members, Belgium’s legislation was among the most liberal.  Patrick Ireland (2004, 182) 
argues that “the country had . . . some of the most liberal legislation in Europe”. 
How can we explain this puzzle?  Again, I argue that one must focus on the degree to 
which the domestic institutional climate protects immigrant rights against governmental 
interference.  With the Vlaams Belang gaining ground throughout the 1990s, the Belgian 
government clearly faced a strong incentive to crack down, and yet no such crackdown 
happened.  Why?  My interviews with political actors in Belgium, both inside and outside of 
government, reveal that Belgium has one of the strongest institutional regimes for immigrant 
rights protection in the world.
7  Particularly among NGOs who fight to uphold immigrant rights 
and freedoms, Belgium is grudgingly acknowledged to be a relatively positive system, where 
                                                 
7 Author Interviews with three Belgian Government Officials: #23, Official at Belgian Office des Etrangers 
(anonymous by request of subject), Brussels, Belgium, 19 April 2005; #25, Official at Belgian Interior Ministry 
(anonymous by request of subject), Brussels, Belgium, 26 January 2005; and #41, Official at Belgian Office des 
Etrangers (anonymous by request of subject), Brussels, Belgium, 25 April 2005. 
  8meddling governments cannot arbitrarily start deporting foreigners and closing the borders in 
order to look tough on immigration.
8
In a survey I gave to various lawyers, academics, NGOs and other experts in Brussels, I 
asked respondents to assign all 15 EU member states a score between one and five based on the 
degree to which “institutions like courts” tend to: “1) protect the rights of immigrants and/or 
asylum-seekers very strongly; 2) protect these rights to a significant/large degree; 3) protect 
these rights only moderately; 4) protect these rights sporadically and/or in a strictly limited 
fashion; and 5) offer very minimal protection”.  The average score for Belgium was 2.5, making 
it (in the eyes of these experts) the country with the third-strongest rights protection regime out 
of the EU-15.
9
One noted Belgian immigration lawyer and former EU Commission official that I 
interviewed, while highly critical of government crackdowns on immigrant rights, admitted that 
“it’s true that we have a still quite open policy”.  Noting the lack of transparency in the Belgian 
administrative/legal system for dealing with immigration, this lawyer highlighted the fact that a 
healthy number of “liberal” decisions are reached semi-covertly, away from the gaze of the 
media or political parties.  Specifically, he emphasized the fact that the Belgian Conseil d’Etat, 
which in theory is a general legal body for appealing administrative rulings, has become a de 
facto immigration court, with approximately 80% of its cases on this subject.
10  In the tradition 
of continental law, this administrative court makes its decisions behind closed doors, with 
relatively little public exposure.  While this may be detrimental to the aims of democracy and 
                                                 
8 Author Interviews with two immigrant advocacy NGO workers, one immigration lawyer, two policy analysts, and 
one Green Party strategist: respectively, #40, Isabelle Doyen, Association pour la Defense des Droits des Etrangers, 
Brussels, Belgium, 21 April 2005; #42, Jose Sanchez, Démocratie Plus, Brussels, Belgium, 26 April 2005; #5, 
Philippe De Bruycker, Brussels, Belgium, 26 April 2005; #31, Thierry Timmermans, Fondation Roi Baudouin, 
Brussels, Belgium, 4 April 2005; #43, Joanna Apap, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium, 2 
August 2003; and #34, Tinne Van der Straeten, Green Party, Brussels, Belgium, 6 April 2005. 
9 Survey of experts carried out by author in Summer of 2003, Brussels, Belgium.  Data are available upon request. 
10 Interview #5. 
  9legitimacy, it does seem to have served the aim of protecting immigrant rights.  Additionally, 
interview subjects repeatedly confirmed that the Belgian legal system gives relatively generous 
legal aid for immigrants who cannot afford a lawyer.
11
Several high-level functionaries in Belgium’s national-level immigration department, the 
Office of Foreigners, admitted to me in interviews that the Conseil D’Etat quietly and steadily 
carries out “regularizations” of illegal immigrants, often on “humanitarian” grounds, which offer 
a privileged position under Belgian law.
12  One civil servant highlighted a case where a young 
girl (and her parents) were granted a residence permit, against the wishes of the Office of 
Foreigners, simply because it was deemed too harsh to remove her from school during the school 
year.  Importantly, the same civil servant complained that the Conseil d’Etat was very “vexing”, 
in that it tended to annul many decisions of her office.  Since she had a great deal of familiarity 
with jurisprudence in other EU countries, I asked her if Belgium’s national institutions were 
more protective than in the other countries, and she agreed.  Highlighting Belgian “juridisme” 
and the role of the Conseil d’Etat, as well as a general “pragmatism” permeating Belgium’s 
institutions, she argued that the Belgian system institutionalizes “tolerance” and individual 
rights: 
“On the whole, yes, we have a lot of protections, and I would even say that the 
Belgian Conseil d’Etat goes much further than the European Court of Human 
Rights in very many domains . . . the Belgian philosophy is that we quickly give a 
right to stay, and once this right is gained, it’s very rare that we would send 
somebody unless they commit extremely grave infractions . . . this security in law 
is the strongest element . . . I believe that it is truly the principle of law that is 
most applied in the area of immigration” 
 
                                                 
11 Interviews #23, #25, #40, #41 and #42. 
12 Interviews #23 and #41. 
  10This civil servant capped her analysis of Belgian institutional protections for immigrant 
rights with an incredible estimation of how many of her office’s expulsion (deportation) 
decisions are overturned by the Conseil d’Etat . . . nine out of ten!
13
A related national-level institutional advantage for immigrants is their strong position in 
nationality/citizenship law, and by extension, voting and political power.  Belgian 
nationality/citizenship law is widely regarded to be the most liberal in Europe, with only a 3-year 
waiting period to become a citizen.  Additionally, foreigners are allowed to vote in local 
elections, and are actually required to register to vote.  State-funded groups, such as the Council 
of Bruxellois of Foreign Origin, assist immigrants with the voting process, and with the 
acquisition of citizenship.
14
What about the opinions of Belgian NGOs who defend immigrant rights?  Normally, 
immigrant advocacy groups refrain from praising the governments that they battle on a daily 
basis.  However, in interviews with NGOs, I heard grudging words of support for Belgium’s 
institutional protections (if not its politicians and media).
15  One NGO leader admitted that 
Belgium is one of the few countries where nationality law does not link citizenship to 
“integration” conditions (such as language).  The same activist also highlighted a generous body 
of law regarding the rights (against deportation) of non-citizen categories such as students and 
family members of already-resident immigrants, as well as the fact that illegal immigrant minors 
have the right to social aid and education under Belgian law and administrative practice.
16
                                                 
13 Interview #23. 
14 Interview #43; and #44, Patrick Gabriels, Conseil des Bruxellois d’origine étrangère, Brussels, Belgium, 27 April 
2005. 
15 Interviews #40, #42, #44, #45, Luc Denys, Immigration Lawyer, Brussels, Belgium, 20 April 2005; and #46, 
Anne Dussart, Caritas, Brussels, Belgium, 22 April 2005. 
16 Interview #40. 
  11From the above evidence, we see that the political salience of immigration in Belgium is 
incredibly high, public opinion is quite hostile towards immigration, and yet immigrant rights are 
institutionally protected against governmental crackdowns.  This, in effect, puts the Belgian 
government in a trap.  In the remainder of this section, therefore, I will track the attempts by 
Belgian governments over the past decade to escape from this trap.  I will attempt to show that 
there is a link between the aforementioned trap, and the (consistently positive) position of the 
Belgian government towards turning over control of immigration policy to the EU. 
In 1996, the European Union began negotiations over a new Treaty: the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.  As mentioned in the introduction, these negotiations offered the possibility for the 
EU to gain a large degree of control over immigration policy, and caused a split among member 
states.  With its stridently anti-immigrant public opinion, growing far-Right party strength, and 
with a majority of the Belgian public feeling that European integration would lead to more 
immigration, one must wonder: what would the Belgian government’s position be? 
  Surprisingly, along with the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria, Belgium’s position 
was the most unabashedly positive towards granting the EU a wide degree of institutional power 
over immigration.  Hix and Niessen (1996) followed the negotiations over immigration in the 
Intergovernmental Conference leading up to the Amsterdam Treaty, and identified fifteen areas 
where the EU could be granted control.  Belgium and the other three countries mentioned above 
supported EU control in 14 of the 15 areas, including (most importantly) making immigration a 
“normal” area of EU law.  Taking this latter step would have meant that only the European 
Commission could propose new immigration laws, the European Council would vote on these 
laws by majority (so no country would have a veto), the European Parliament would gain a veto 
  12over these laws, and the European Court of Justice would gain jurisdiction to interpret these laws 
(and annul national laws which contravened them). 
  However, ultimately the Belgian delegation did not get its wish, and the Amsterdam 
Treaty produced a watered-down institutional structure whereby member states themselves could 
propose new immigration laws, the European Council would vote by unanimity, the Parliament 
would have no veto power, and the European Court of Justice could only take referrals from high 
courts (Geddes 2000).  Despite this lack of solid EU control, however, Amsterdam did succeed 
in allowing the EU to pass (in theory) binding immigration legislation. 
  In the years following the Amsterdam Treaty’s adoption, several key pieces of 
immigration legislation were negotiated, including directives that would harmonize the status 
and rights of long-term resident immigrants, and also their family members who wished to gain 
entry to EU territory.  During these negotiations, the main issue to be debated was the degree to 
which the legislation would be “harmonized” and binding; in other words, the “hardness” of the 
law (meaning the degree to which member states would be given national discretion).  Would the 
laws obligate member states to specific targets in a variety of areas concerning immigrant rights, 
or would member states be able to act in a relatively autonomous fashion, in crafting inconsistent 
national legislation towards long-term resident immigrants and their family members? 
  During these negotiations, circa 2000-2003, the Belgian delegation was a leader in 
supporting “hard” laws that would minimize national discretion.  In March of 2001, the 
European Commission presented the draft directive on the status of long-term resident 
immigrants, which bound member states to specific norms regarding the status and rights of 
these immigrants.  Though many member states expressed reluctance about the scope of this 
directive, the Belgian delegation, in a Council meeting of July 2001, said that “this Directive 
  13would be a priority of the future Belgian presidency” (European Council 2001, 4).  In the same 
meeting, the Belgian delegation (joined only by France and Italy) unsuccessfully argued in favor 
of the Commission’s wish to include refugees within the scope of this directive (7).  In the 
months that followed, Belgium was one of the only delegations that consistently defended the 
Commission’s draft proposal against watering-down by other member states, who succeeded in 
adding national discretion in a variety of areas.  Additionally, the exact same dynamic happened 
with the proposed Directive on immigration for the purposes of family reunification.  The 
Commission proposed a draft in 1999, and despite Belgian support for the Commission’s draft, a 
solid majority of member states succeeded in paring down the legal language in the directive so 
that they were faced with a minimum of hard obligations (European Council, various years). 
  In 2004, the member states negotiated the Hague Programme, an institutional blueprint 
which would guide EU immigration policy in the event of the European Constitution’s failure.  
The Hague Programme would make immigration policy a “normal” area of EU control, but a key 
sticking point in the negotiations soon arose.  A majority of member states wanted to exempt 
legal immigration from this institutional arrangement, preferring to keep unanimity voting and 
block the European Parliament from having veto power.  Belgium, however, supported full EU 
control, but was again unsuccessful in achieving this goal. 
  To broadly assess Belgium’s support for EU control over immigration policy, I surveyed 
a group of academics, lawyers, NGOs and civil servants in Brussels familiar with the 
negotiations.  I asked these respondents to rank each of the 15 countries from 1 to 5 based on the 
degree to which its government tended to favor: 1) none or almost no harmonization at all; 2) 
some limited harmonization measures; 3) A significant amount of harmonization, but with 
exceptions; 4) A majority of harmonization proposals; or 5) All or nearly all harmonization 
  14proposals.  Belgium received a 3.25 average, just below the highest country, which was Portugal 
at 3.63.
17
Why was Belgium such an enthusiastic supporter of hard, binding EU immigration law?  
I will conclude this section by giving evidence for my argument that Belgium knew full well that 
any laws coming out of Brussels would be less generous than its own national legislation (which 
was, by most measures, the most generous in Europe), and would thus allow it to circumvent 
national institutional protections in cracking down on immigrant rights, thereby neutralizing far-
Right support. 
Let us examine NGO opinion first.  The same activist who praised Belgium’s national 
institutional protections fretted that the government in power wished to become more strict.  
When I asked her to give examples of legislative changes in a stricter direction, she immediately 
said “that is to say, they have transposed many European directives!”  When speaking about the 
transposition of European law into Belgian law, she worried:  
“I have the impression that effectively Belgium is going to profit from this by 
lowering its standards of protection.  Concerning the length of stay, notably for 
recognized refugees, they envisage having a temporary right of stay for 3 years, 
while for the moment recognized refugees always have the right to stay 
permanently.”
18
 
What about the opinions of Belgian civil servants themselves?  In an interview with a 
high-level administrator at the Office of Foreigners, I brought up the directive on the status of 
Long-Term Residents, and suggested that this directive is “a bit less generous than Belgian law”.  
In response, she said: “a lot less! . . . we have the notion of the unlimited stay, which doesn’t 
exist in other countries.  We should have a limited stay”.
19  On the whole, the civil servants that I 
                                                 
17 Survey of experts carried out by author in Summer of 2003, Brussels, Belgium.  Data are available upon request. 
18 Interview #40. 
19 Interview #23. 
  15interviewed seemed favorable towards the legislation that had come out of Brussels thus far, 
which was quite restrictive towards immigrant rights.
20
  One immigration lawyer who had also worked in the European Commission argued that 
the Belgian government was desperate to change immigration law, but was paralyzed at the 
national level, because it was a “taboo topic”.  Thus, he said that “the only thing that will make 
changes are the EU directives . . . the presence of the Vlaams Belang is poison . . . I am sure that 
the VB will use the Family Reunification directive and say: ‘why don’t you put that into law’?”  
The same interviewee highlighted the fact that the EU directive on Long-Term Resident status 
mandates a waiting period of five years to get Long-Term Resident status, which is two years 
more than the current three-year waiting period to get Belgian citizenship!
21
  On the whole, my interviews confirmed that the Belgian government, a broad coalition of 
parties spanning both mainstream Left and Right (thus potentially neutralizing partisanship as an 
alternative explanation), seeks to tighten immigration policy.
22  Transposing European 
legislation is the only way to tighten policy, however, given Belgium’s strong domestic 
institutions.  Thus, the Belgian government trades away formal policy control to Brussels, in 
order to achieve de facto policy success. 
 
3. France 
  Unlike Belgium, France has been only a wavering supporter of harmonizing immigration 
policy.  While not totally opposed to either EU control in the institutional realm, or hard, binding 
immigration laws at EU level, France has not consistently favored these steps either.  In fact, the 
                                                 
20 Interviews #23, #25 and #41. 
21 Interview #5. 
22 Though partisanship plays a role on issues of immigrant integration into society, as explained in the Conclusion to 
this chapter. 
  16French government moved from moderate opposition in the late 1990s, to moderate support for 
EU control in the new millennium (Hix and Niessen 1996, Geddes 2000, Givens and Luedtke 
2004).  Consistent with my argument, this section will show how the combination of moderate 
national institutional protection for immigrant rights, mixed with the moderate political salience 
of immigration, pushed France into a middle-ground position, becoming slightly more pro-
integrationist in the later years of the period 1996-2004.  As in the Belgian case, political 
partisanship cannot explain this small shift, or the larger trend of moderate support, because 
changes in the partisan composition of French governments did not coincide with changes in 
support for EU control.  In 1996-97, a right-wing government was relatively opposed to EU 
control.  France began to moderately support EU control, however, under a left-wing government 
in 2000-2001.  But under the right-wing majority of 2002, France moved to even stronger 
support! 
In the early stages of institution-building (Amsterdam), the French government opposed 
EU control in eight of the 15 policy areas on the table (Hix and Niessen 1996).  This placed it 
above Denmark and the UK in terms of support for harmonization, but below 10 of the other 15 
member states.  However, by the time that the first pieces of EU immigration legislation were put 
on the table, in 2000, the French government had grown somewhat more enthusiastic about EU 
control.  In the negotiations over the aforementioned two pieces of legislation, the directives on 
Long-Term Residents and Family Reunification, France was part of a group of six or seven 
member states (including Belgium) who opposed moves towards granting national discretion 
over immigration law (European Council, various years).  While not as consistent or strident of 
an EU supporter as Belgium, France certainly opposed the majority sentiment (spearheaded by 
Germany and the UK) of preserving national discretion.  This trend grew even stronger by 2004, 
  17in the negotiations over the Hague Programme.  I spoke with the civil servant who led the French 
delegation at these negotiations, and he confirmed this point: “The position of France, which is 
new, is to make everything subject to qualified majority voting [in the Council, a key element of 
EU control], because we estimate that it needs to be coherent and it would be difficult . . . if we 
are going to have a real EU policy, without qualified majority voting and a role for the 
Parliament”.
23
Confirming that France is still considered a middle-ground case, however, in the survey I 
gave to experts, asking them to assess the degree to which each member state supported 
harmonization, France scored a 3.06 on a scale of 1-5, putting it at 10
th place out of the EU-15 in 
terms of supporting EU control.
24  Thus, although France has become more enthusiastic about 
harmonization, it still places well behind Belgium in terms of its support.  And again, France’s 
moderately supportive position in the negotiations over the Long-Term Residents and Family 
Reunification directives confirms this point. 
If shifts in partisan composition of government cannot explain France’s middle-ground 
position, what can?  Recall that my argument is about national governments being caught in a 
trap.  The hypothesis posited at the outset was that high salience, on its own, pushes governments 
to oppose EU control, but in countries where institutional rights protection for immigrants is 
strong, salience actually has the opposite effect, pushing governments to support EU control in 
the hopes that European legislation will allow it to crack down on immigrant rights. 
By this logic, we would expect that a country with only moderate salience, but also 
moderate institutional protection for immigrant rights, would face little pressure to take extreme 
positions either way.  Unlike the Belgian government’s desperation to use EU legislation to 
                                                 
23 Interview #7, Official at France’s EU Permanent Representation (anonymous by request of subject), Brussels, 
Belgium, 24 November 2004. 
24 Survey of experts carried out by author in Summer of 2003, Brussels, Belgium.  Data are available upon request. 
  18circumvent national institutional protections (and the far-Right threat), France actually saw the 
political salience of immigration diminish between 1996 and 2004, as its weaker (compared to 
Belgium) domestic institutions for protecting immigrant rights allowed it some leeway for 
domestic crackdowns (Eurobarometer, various years). 
French governments also enjoy a weaker far-Right threat than Belgium, due to the lower 
salience of immigration, and also to its differing electoral rules (Belgium uses proportional 
representation, which favors smaller and more extreme parties).  Although much attention was 
given to the fact that far-Right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen took second place in the French 
presidential elections of 2002, this showing was of largely symbolic value, since it did not 
translate into office-holding of any kind.  At the legislative level, public support for the far Right 
has actually been diminishing, as the ruling center-Right UMP party (and its outspoken Interior 
Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy) managed to steal much of Le Pen’s thunder on issues such as crime 
and immigration. 
How does France fare in terms of the political salience of immigration?  Unlike Belgium, 
France has no widespread tabloid media to stir up anti-immigrant feeling.  While Belgian NGOs 
and immigration lawyers consistently complained about their country’s tabloid media in my 
interviews, their French counterparts actually tended to praise the media for its even-handed 
approach!  One activist admitted that: “there is truly an important enough effort on the part of the 
press, and it’s true that we utilize the press quite well . . . they take our communiqués fairly 
easily . . . it’s not bad for us.”
25
In terms of public opinion, the political salience of immigration in France has never been 
extreme in either direction, relative to other EU countries.  I examined public opinion data 
                                                 
25 Interview #38, staff member at the National Association for Assistance to Foreigners at the Border (anonymous 
upon request of subject), Paris, France, 27 June 2005. 
  19between 1997 and 2004 (Eurobarometer, various years) and found that France was never in the 
top four or the bottom four EU-15 countries in terms of identifying immigration as one of the 
most important issues facing the nation.  Although one might get the impression, from the high 
profile of the extreme Right in France, that the French public is convulsed in worries over 
immigration, the data do not bear this out.  In 2004, only 8 percent of the French public 
identified immigration as one of the two most important issues facing the nation, as compared 
with 18 percent of the Belgian public and 35 percent of the British public (Eurobarometer 2004).  
That being said, in the same poll nearly a third of the EU-15 countries scored even lower than 
France on salience.  This confirms my argument that France is a middle-ground case. 
What about national institutional rights protection for immigrants?  Again, France seems 
to be a moderate case, with the government successfully implementing a wide legislative 
crackdown on immigration in recent years, yet in practice losing many individual battles on a 
case-by-case basis. 
In my interviews, academics, NGOs, civil servants and immigration lawyers painted a 
picture of a slow but steady decline in formal immigrant rights, punctuated by the Sarkozy law of 
2003, which dramatically reduced immigrant rights on paper.  In practice, however, interview 
subjects admitted that the combination of French legal institutions (such as appeals courts and 
legal aid for NGOs and indigent clients) and administrative practice curtailed the government’s 
implementation powers to some degree.
26
One activist who works with immigrants detained at the frontier highlighted the dramatic 
effect of the Sarkozy law in terms of policing and securitizing immigration policy:  
                                                 
26 Interviews #7, #38, #39, Antione Chassen, Federation of Associations for Solidarity with Immigrant Workers, 
Paris, France, 22 June 2005; #47, Marie DuFlou, Group for Information and Support of Immigrants, Paris, France, 
22 June 2005; #48, Jerome Martinez, CIMADE, Paris, France, 24 May 2005. 
  20“. . . the multiplication of controls in the country of departure . . . the Sarkozy law 
has put in place certain measures that make it so that persons are not able 
anymore to get on the airplanes . . . Also, the Sarkozy law has augmented the 
powers of the police in holding zones [such as French airports] . . . thus the 
Sarkozy law today functions quite well as a ‘police vision’ . . . this permits the 
police to deport people immediately, as soon as they find a place on a flight of 
return”. 
 
This activist expressed frustration that in theory immigrants could contact a lawyer before being 
deported, but in practice have not been allowed to do so since the passage of the Sarkozy law.  In 
other words, the French government curtailed access to legal protections – something which has 
not occurred to nearly the same degree in Belgium.
27
What about institutional protections for immigrants who can access a lawyer, in terms of 
the appeals process and legal aid?  As in Belgium, France has an administrative appeals court 
which is relatively non-transparent, and which tends to give relatively generous legal aid to 
immigrants and their supporters.  However, in stark contrast to Belgium, where many of my 
NGO interviewees gave grudging praise of their national system, French NGOs and immigration 
lawyers were uniformly and highly critical of the French system.  Noting that successive changes 
to French law had stripped away legal protections, French NGOs tended to paint a dark picture.
28  
One activist, while admitting that “in Paris, it works, because organizations have the means to 
take cases to the Conseil d’Etat” also noted that “this rarely saves the person.  Often they are 
already deported [when the case is won].  But this permits us to obtain advances in the law . . . 
but for associations which are not in Paris, this is something impossible”.
29  In other words, there 
are some signs of hope in the French system, and NGOs can often chip away at the government’s 
restrictionism.  However, all interview subjects agreed that France has been able to successfully 
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  21restrict policy, on its own, at the national level, and this contrasts starkly with the Belgian case, 
where the government’s hands are seen as tied. 
How does France’s middle-ground position actually play out in the negotiations in 
Brussels over EU control of immigration policy?  Again, I expect to find that, unlike Belgium, 
France shifts positions relatively easily, since it does not find itself in the same type of trap.  
Indeed, one high-level French diplomat whom I interviewed painted an interesting picture of 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s influence on France’s position.  Recall that the Sarkozy Law of 2003 was 
widely blamed for a draconian restriction of immigrant rights.  However, Sarkozy, around the 
same time, became more supportive of EU control!  My interview subject led the French 
delegation who negotiated the Long-Term Residents directive between 2000 and 2003, and had 
this to say:  “At the Luxembourg Council, the position of France on the Long Term Residents 
directive wasn’t well-defined, so when Sarkozy came to Luxembourg he was furious, because 
the position of France until that point had been to block the directive!”  After France shifted to 
supporting the directive, however, a battle began, and France ultimately gave in to the more anti-
harmonization member states, led by Germany.  Thus, France shifted from opposition, to strong 
support, to finally accepting defeat.  The French negotiator described this ambiguity for me: 
“There was a face-off between France and Germany, and a game was played by the 
Greek Presidency . . . their position was closer to Germany’s, even though it was Germany and 
Austria against the other 13 member states.  The Greeks said to the 13, ‘why don’t you move to 
the German position?’  Finally, Sarkozy decided that the compromise was acceptable . . . other 
member states were amazed”.
30
 
Thus, in finding that both political salience and institutional protections for immigrant 
rights reach only moderate levels in France, I find that the French government is not caught in a 
trap.  Unlike the Belgian government, the Chirac-Sarkozy regime has been able to neutralize far-
Right support (and bring down the political salience of immigration) by lowering the standard of 
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  22immigrant rights.  This leaves them free to support EU control on certain issues, and in certain 
areas, where they might feel they can gain further leeway to crack down.  However, it also leaves 
them free to oppose EU control and favor national discretion when they so wish. 
 
4.  The United Kingdom 
  Unlike the French government, the government of the UK has a position towards EU 
control over immigration policy that is anything but ambiguous.  The UK has consistently 
opposed EU control over immigration policy, and in 1996, when it was clear that 12 of the other 
15 member states (the UK was joined in its skepticism by Denmark and Ireland) wanted to 
proceed with harmonization, the UK secured an “opt-out” from all immigration policy at EU 
level.  Thus, Britain does not participate in most EU immigration policy, and has no plans to do 
so in the future.  This section will explain why the UK has been such a strident opponent of EU 
control, highlighting the high political salience of immigration in the UK, but the very weak 
level of institutional rights protection for immigrants at national level.  Thus, the UK has not 
needed Brussels to implement its policy preferences, since it has been able to successfully crack 
down in immigrant rights in recent years, thus heading off political threats from anti-immigrant 
forces, such as the tabloid media and the new far Right parties (Veritas and the UK 
Independence Party, or UKIP).  The section will close by highlighting two important areas where 
the UK has actually deviated from its opposition and decided to participate in EU control – 
namely, the areas of political asylum policy and anti-discrimination policy.  Both exceptions 
confirm my theory, however, since political asylum is a domain where domestic judges have 
blocked the government’s moves to crack down, and anti-discrimination policy (consistent with 
the alternative hypothesis expressed in the introduction) is an immigration-related issue where 
  23partisanship actually plays a strong role (unlike issues of immigration control), and where Left 
governments are generally supportive of harmonization regardless of salience or institutions 
(Money 1999).  Though the Conservative government of John Major opposed participating in 
anti-discrimination policy at EU level, the Blair government supported this move after taking 
office in 1997. 
Before getting to the exceptions, however, let us first trace the UK’s decade-long history 
of opposing EU control over immigration policy in general.  At the 1996 negotiations over the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the UK opposed EU control over immigration policy in 13 of the 15 areas on 
the table, making it the least integrationist of all 15 member states (Hix and Niessen 1996).  In 
March 1996 the British government released a White Paper which “explicitly stated that Britain 
opposed any transfer of powers to the Community Framework or any increased role for the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, and that the British 
government would do everything possible to maintain control at Britain’s borders” (Hix and 
Niessen 1996, 57).  In the White Paper, the government stated that “these are matters of high 
domestic political sensitivity involving questions of national sovereignty . . . There can be no 
question of supranational solutions imposed on Member States, regardless of national sentiment 
or varying social and legal traditions” (quoted in Hix and Niessen, 57). 
Thus, the UK (along with Denmark and Ireland) secured its famous “opt-out”, meaning 
that it was not bound by any EU laws passed in the field of immigration, and it did not vote on 
these laws in the European Council.  Although the UK followed the negotiations over the Family 
Reunification and Long-Term Residents Directives with some interest, it had no plans to 
participate in the near future.  And when the negotiations over the Hague Programme arose in 
2004, the UK took no position on whether or not all areas of immigration policy should move to 
  24“normal” institutional arrangements (majority voting in Council, veto power for the Parliament), 
since it would not be bound by these arrangements.
31
Why does Britain oppose EU control over immigration policy?  As in Belgium, this 
section will show that the political salience of immigration is quite high in the UK, and the 
combination of a vocal tabloid media and open political mobilization along anti-immigrant lines 
puts extreme pressure on the government.  However, unlike Belgium, the UK has extremely 
weak institutional protections for immigrant rights, and my data will show that this lack of 
institutional blockage has allowed the Blair government to severely crack down in immigrant 
rights in recent years. 
Let us first dive into the data on salience.  Between 1997 and 2004, the political salience 
of immigration in the UK increased in both relative and absolute terms.  In 1997, 15 percent of 
UK citizens identified immigration as a key problem facing the nation, placing Britain at a tie for 
fifth place in the EU-15 in terms of high salience.  By 2004, this number was up to 35 percent, 
giving the UK the highest salience level in the entire EU (Eurobarometer, various years).  Recall 
the argument that high salience, on its own, tends to push against EU control, since governments 
do not want to be seen giving up control over national borders and sovereignty unless absolutely 
necessary in order to implement policy goals (cracking down on immigration). 
As for media coverage of immigration, the UK is famous for having the world’s most 
vocal anti-immigrant tabloid press.  All of my UK interview subjects, whether civil servants, 
lawyers, academics or NGOs, tended to bemoan the quality and quantity of immigration press 
coverage in the UK.
32  One NGO staff member argued that there was a “very, very strong 
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  25vilification of immigrants by the British press”
33, and a civil servant I interviewed argued that 
“the way in which it’s reported is seen by ministers and politicians as unhelpful, not accurate, not 
balanced”.  When I asked him whether the media drives government policy, he replied “it’s not 
something officials are immune to”.
 34  One immigration lawyer who regularly speaks to 
Parliament argued that “they’re so reactive to the press, the press sets the political agenda and the 
government then reacts to it.”
35  Another civil servant argued that the media and the public “feed 
upon each other” and stated that in terms of pushing for crackdowns, “the media is very crucial 
here”.
36  One immigration lawyer highlighted the fact that in 2004 Tony Blair radically cut legal 
aid available to immigrants, only after making a speech to a Labour Party Conference in which 
he stated that immigration lawyers were on a “gravy train”, which was then “picked up by the 
press and was literally front-page news in some of the gutter press”.  Blair followed by cutting 
legal aid available to immigrants, which has not happened in Belgium or France, despite those 
governments’ strong desire to be seen as tougher on immigrants.
37
The same British immigration lawyer highlighted two particular tabloids with large 
circulation, in giving a deeper analysis of the role of the British press in shaping the debate, 
particularly around the period 2002-2004 when the Blair government radically restricted 
immigrant rights: 
“There are two tabloids which concentrate on immigration: the Daily Express and 
the Daily Mail . . . a couple of years ago the Daily Express had headlined with a 
story about migration issues every day for something like 46 days . . . there’s no 
responsible use of language, so they’ll use words like ‘illegal immigrants’ 
whereas in fact there isn’t . . . an illegal immigrant . . . and they use the word 
‘refugee’ to describe asylum-seekers . . . I got home from a holiday one night and 
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  26went into my corner shop, just to get some milk, and saw the Daily Express 
headline of ‘Refugees Will Be Tagged’.  Now, refugees have never been tagged 
and will never be tagged, and what they really meant was some asylum-seekers 
will be subject to electronic curfews as an alternative to detention . . . and one has 
this consistent vilification which is now spreading.” 
  
Given that Britain is known for its tradition of civil liberties, individualism and limited 
government, it might seem surprising that a British government has been able to radically restrict 
immigrant rights in recent years, as compared to France or Belgium, where the governments 
have been prevented from tampering with immigrants’ access to legal appeals or legal aid.  This 
might seem especially surprising given that the crackdown was carried out by a Left government, 
and that Britain has no strong far Right party.  However, recall the hypothesis that there will be 
no significant differences between Left and Right governments in terms of immigration control 
policies (Money 1999).  The only policies where we will see significant differences is on policies 
to integrate already-resident immigrants, and in fact (as we will see in the conclusion to this 
chapter) the Blair government has been quite liberal (and pro-EU) when it comes to the latter 
type of policies.  As for the far Right, though Britain’s winner-take-all electoral system prevents 
a strong far-Right challenger, the incredibly high political salience of immigration did spark 
several far-Right challenges in local, regional and European-level elections in the UK (which use 
electoral rules that are more favorable to small parties), from new parties such as Veritas and 
UKIP.  In my interview with a UKIP strategist, not only did she admit that the tabloid media are 
“overall quite helpful to us”, she also blamed the Tories for “stealing our clothes” on the 
immigration debate.
38
So how and why has the Blair government been able to radically restrict immigrant rights 
at home, including changes to legal-institutional protections such as appeal rights and legal aid?  
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  27This has to do with the lack of checks and balances in the British political system, including the 
lack of separation of powers and of a strong institution of judicial review (Freeman 1994).  In my 
interviews with immigration lawyers and civil servants, I learned that the Blair government has 
tampered with the legal system by restricting appeal rights for immigrants.
39  When I asked one 
of my interviewees if there had been a “general ratcheting-down of the standard of rights and 
protections” she answered that “it’s particularly come at the level of the appeals system, and I 
think it’s come for political reasons, in that the appeals system seemed to be expensive and it 
seemed to string things out . . . the time limits have speeded up, throughout the appeals system, 
procedural rules have become stricter”.
40  Ironically, (as compared to France and Belgium) the 
very openness of Britain’s common-law based judicial system has exposed the Blair government 
to more anti-immigrant public pressure to restrict access to this system and cut remedies for 
immigrants.  And since Britain has no written constitution, the Blair government (like all British 
governments) can pass legislation changing the basic structure of legal institutions without facing 
prohibitive constitutional challenges (Freeman 1994).  For example, the Blair government has 
restricted appeals for family visit immigrants, and is in the process of abolishing oral hearings for 
this class of immigrants.  One immigration lawyer complained that:  
“The appeals system has just changed so much even in the sort of 10 years or so 
that I’ve been practicing – we’ve seen huge changes – every few years there’s a 
bill and it brings some form of change to the appeals system . . . and then last 
April a new appeals system has come into force which is really very different 
from the previous one.  It used to be the case that you would appeal to an 
adjudicator who was a first-instance . . . judicial decision-maker, and if you lost, 
you could get permission to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribune, which is a 
second tier, and from there you could go to the Court of Appeal, and the 
government in effect abolished the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, so theoretically 
speaking you’ve got one tier . . . it was, quite simply, unpragmatic as well as 
pretty appalling that the government was abolishing a whole tier of court”.
41
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Additionally, the Blair government (unlike in France and Belgium) has been quite 
successful in restricting the legal aid that is available to immigrants and their defenders.  One of 
my interview subjects characterized this change (in early 2004) and the subsequent constitutional 
debate that raged, as critics accused the Blair government of “unconstitutional” tampering: 
“The Legal Services Commission announced that it was going to cap the amount 
of legal aid for both asylum and immigration cases, and in immigration cases it 
was something like 3 hours [maximum paid time for a lawyer] . . . prior to any 
decision.  There was a huge hullabaloo about that and the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee [of the House of Commons] looked at it, and I gave evidence to the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee . . . and it was me, then the Law Society, and 
various other NGO types, and we managed to persuade the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee . . . to criticize those plans, so even before the Committee had 
published its report it was clear that they were going to come down on our side as 
opposed to on the Legal Services Commission’s side, so the Legal Services 
Commission and the Home Office and the Department for Constitutional Affairs 
got together and came up with a different plan even before the report was out, and 
they did that after we’d all given our evidence thus denying the Committee any 
chance to scrutinize the new plan, so the Committee then criticized the 
government for doing that.  It criticized the fact that the Legal Services 
Commission, the Department for Constitutional Affairs and the Home Office are 
all meant to have a separate constitutional role, yet they were all coming together 
to produce this new scheme, and I mean, basically the scheme came into effect . . 
. it is generally much more difficult to get extensions of funding after you get your 
certain, your basic amount, and there’s a huge amount of bureaucracy and 
paperwork which has to be completed and dealt with, so there’s more paperwork, 
more hanging around on the telephone waiting for the Legal Services Committee 
to answer, it’s become more bureaucratic so that means you spend a lot of time, 
solicitors are spending a lot of time filling out these wretched forms and being on 
the telephone, which basically doesn’t pay very much to do that, so they find it 
very difficult and many have given up doing legal aid work because of that 
problem.”
42
  
As mentioned above, in the section on Belgium, the Belgian legal system protects 
deportable immigrants by allowing them to remain in the county on humanitarian grounds.  
Despite heavy far-Right pressure, and an openly expressed desire to crack down on immigration 
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  29(Belgian Government, 2004), the Belgian government has not been able to limit these 
humanitarian protections that are built into its legal system.  Indeed, recall that the Belgian civil 
servants whom I interviewed felt that their country’s system was too generous, and that judges 
overturned their decisions too frequently.  This contrasts with the case of Britain, where similar 
humanitarian exceptions to immigration law have been stripped away.  I asked a British 
immigration lawyer about the possibility for discretion/leniency on humanitarian grounds (as 
happens so regularly in Belgium that many observers describe it as a de facto “regularization” of 
illegal immigrants).  In Britain, however: 
“It’s happening less and less . . . before 2003 we had ‘exceptional leave to remain’ 
which was any decision allowing someone to remain in the UK that was outside 
the immigration rules, and that imported a huge degree of flexibility, and although 
there were policies governing the exercise of discretion outside the immigration 
rules, you could always put in some representations to the Home Office saying 
look, he really is a bit sick, he shouldn’t really be allowed to go, or, she really 
would be at risk of domestic violence back in her country of origin, she shouldn’t 
really be forced to go – and that would actually often do the trick.  Then in 2003 it 
became much more structured, because the government felt people were 
exploiting exceptional leave to remain, so they introduced a scheme . . . it’s a 
very, very, very high threshold, and there’s just been a case gone through the 
House of Lords called ‘N’ about a woman who was threatened with expulsion to 
Uganda who is HIV positive and the House of Lords basically said it did not 
trigger the UK’s international human rights obligations . . . there have been a 
number of decisions really pushing the threshold up . . . it looks like it’s gonna be 
much more difficult to win in the future.”
43
 
Regarding reasons of health, my Belgian interview subjects reported that the Belgian 
government is regularly forced by judges to reverse the expulsion of sick immigrants, including 
those who are HIV-positive.
44  In Britain, however, health exceptions have been stripped away 
by the government. 
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  30  To summarize, we see that Britain has no need of the EU to crack down on immigrant 
rights.  Due to the flexibility of British institutions, the Blair government has dealt with political 
salience and the far Right challenge by effectively curtailing the rights of foreigners at the 
national level, which seems to be the preferred choice of European governments that do not want 
to be seen as granting control over national borders to ‘Eurocrats’.  However, as mentioned in the 
beginning of this section, one cannot simply explain this reticence by invoking British national 
identity or innate euroskepticism, since Britain does participate in the EU’s immigration policy 
regime on several fronts, including the important issue of political asylum.  Why this exception 
in particular?  While it might seem to cast doubt on my theory, since political asylum has been 
the hottest immigration-related issue in Britain in the past five years, in fact it confirms my 
theory regarding the power of national institutional protections for immigrant rights.  Why?  
Because political asylum is the one issue where the British legal system has imposed strong 
constitutional blockages on the Blair government.  British judges have actually annulled parts of 
parliamentary legislation on political asylum, something which wouldn’t have been thought 
possible even a few years ago.  Essentially, the (admittedly narrow) issue of political asylum has 
imposed a surprising ad hoc power of judicial review on Britain, where judges have essentially 
grown teeth, using international human rights law as their inspiration, and actually annulled parts 
of the government’s asylum legislation – specifically on the issue of prison-like detention of 
asylum claimants without access to legal protections.  It was surprising to many observers that a 
British High Court judge ordered the government to change two sections of this law (2002), 
since this is normally not done in the British system.  However, the Blair government complied, 
but then enthusiastically “opted in” and began participating in the EU’s asylum regime, even 
going so far as to propose (at EU meetings) the idea of EU-managed asylum “processing camps” 
  31outside the EU’s borders, where potential refugees could be screened offshore.  From this, it 
seems clear that even a British government, when faced with strong domestic-institutional 
obstacles, is willing to use Brussels to get its way in immigration policy; but only as a last resort. 
 
5.  Discussion of Anti-Discrimination Policy and Conclusion 
  The interview and public opinion data reviewed in this chapter show that political 
salience and the degree to which national institutions protect immigrant rights seem, in 
combination, to explain whether or not a national government supports the EU having control 
over immigration policy.  In Belgium, the government has been under enormous pressure to 
restrict immigration, but has seen its hands tied by generous domestic institutions, including non-
transparent administrative courts with built-in appeal rights, generous legal aid provisions, and a 
generous body of law on citizenship, naturalization and voting.  Belgian civil servants complain 
that they cannot implement their own decisions, due to the leniency of judges in the Conseil 
d’Etat.  Thus, the only way that the Belgian government can restrict immigrant rights is by 
adopting European directives, which are much less generous than Belgian law in terms of the 
rights and freedoms provided to immigrants.  Due to the supremacy of EU law over national law, 
the Belgian government can dodge domestic institutional constraints and begin to lower the 
political salience of immigration by looking “tough”. 
  While France’s moderate levels of political salience and institutional rights protection 
leave it free to take shifting and ambiguous positions on EU control over immigration policy, the 
government of the UK is anything but ambiguous.  I found that political salience, in the absence 
of strong national rights protection, pushes governments to oppose EU control over immigration 
policy.  Indeed, the political salience of immigration in Britain is incredibly high, but the degree 
  32to which national institutions protect immigrant rights is anything but strong, as we have seen 
from the reflections of British political actors on the degree to which the Blair government has 
curbed appeal rights, legal aid, and other institutional protections in recent years.  Thus, Britain 
prefers to oppose EU control over immigration policy, opting in only in two areas, political 
asylum and anti-discrimination.  Britain opts into political asylum policy because its own 
domestic judges have annulled parts of the government’s legislation on the treatment of political 
asylum seekers, a highly surprising development given that Britain has no tradition of judicial 
review. 
  What about anti-discrimination policy?  This is where the role of political partisanship 
comes in.  In contrast with immigration control issues, where we have seen that Left and Right 
alike seek to crack down, we do see strong partisan differences on issues having to do with the 
societal integration of immigrants.  Left parties see already-resident, legal immigrants as 
potential voters, and thus seek to cater to these immigrants, while preferring to look tough on the 
topic of the entry of new immigrants (Lahav 2004; Ireland 2004; Money 1999). 
  Anti-discrimination policy can be seen as a facet of integration, because it deals with 
social discrimination towards ethnic minorities, who are generally either immigrants themselves, 
or are descendents of recent immigrants.  And if I am correct that political partisanship pushes 
Left parties to support integration policies at EU level, while Right parties would be opposed, 
then I would expect to see all governments under Left control (including the UK) to be favorable 
to EU-level anti-discrimination policy. 
  Indeed, in 1996 the Conservative government of the UK expressed strong opposition to 
the idea of an anti-discrimination law at EU level (British Government 1996).  However, in the 
year 2000 such a law was passed, called the Racial Equality Directive, and it enjoyed the strong 
  33support of the UK.  This is a surprising development, considering that the UK continued to 
oppose EU control in all other areas of immigration-related law.  However, it become less 
surprising when one considers the major change in UK politics between 1996 and 2000, namely, 
the election of a Labour government.  Additionally, the Left government in power in France in 
2000 lent its strong support to the Racial Equality Directive, despite its wavering/moderate 
support for other immigration-related instruments at the same time.
45  The center-Left coalition 
in power in Belgium in 2000 also strongly supported the Racial Equality Directive (Givens and 
Luedtke 2004). 
  Therefore, obvious suspects for causal variables, such as partisanship or national identity, 
cannot explain the nuances of national support for supranational immigration policy.  It is only 
when we dive deeper into government preferences that we find a compelling explanation for why 
some national executives would be willing to turn over such a powerful tool to Brussels.  High 
political salience of immigration, in combination with strong domestic protections for immigrant 
rights, pushes national executives to delegate immigration policy as a strategic move to 
implement preferences.  As with other areas of European integration, the loss of formal 
sovereignty is sometimes deemed to be “worth it” (even in a politically heated area such as 
immigration!) considering the potential gains made in terms of policy implementation.  
                                                 
45 Recall that France had been blocking the Long Term Residents directive until the Right-wing interior minister 
Nicolas Sarkozy changed this policy. 
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